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Hiring College Graduates to Flip Hamburgers: 
An Endogenous Theory of Professionalization 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we offer an endogenous theory of professionalization and ever-higher degree 
attainment. We theorize that higher education is a self-driving growth engine. We introduce two 
endogenous mechanisms that act on the education enterprise, causing the number of educated 
people to increase dramatically with relatively short-term changes in the job market. Using an 
illustrative dynamic model based on simple rules of degree attainment and job selection, we 
argue that these self-driving growth engines are adequate to over-incentivize degree attainment, 
and can affect the match between supply and demand for college-educated labor. We also show 
that the mechanisms magnify effects of short-term recessions or technological changes, and 
create long-term waves of mismatch between workforce and jobs. The implication of the theory 
is degree inflation, magnified pressures on those with lower degrees, underemployment, and job 
market mismatch and inefficiency.  
 
Keywords: Education sector, inefficiency, education mismatch, public policy, bullwhip 
effect 
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“Everyone has a right to a university degree in America, even if it’s in Hamburger Technology.”  
Clive James 
Can we claim that the education industry is now providing a more effective and efficient 
service to the entire population of K-Graduate School students? At least across the developed 
world, educational attainment levels have been increasing continually. By comparing the 
education levels of different age groups, we see a clear indication of the growing trends. In 2011, 
82% of the 25-34 age group of OECD countries had completed upper secondary education or 
higher, compared to 64% of the 55-64 age group, showing close to a 30% increase in the portion 
of the population with upper secondary education or higher (OECD, 2013). This trend continues 
into tertiary education, where in 2011 some 39% of the 25-34 age group had completed tertiary 
education, compared to 24% of the 55-64 age group (OECD, 2013). The increasing trend has 
even gone above the PhD level, and now years of postdoctoral work are becoming commonplace 
for many newly minted PhDs. The number of postdocs in U.S. institutions has more than tripled 
in the past 30 years (National Science Foundation, 2011). The demand for higher education has 
also increased, as shown in the number of applications for graduate programs in U.S. 
universities: a rise from 955,000 applicants for graduate programs in 1991 to 1.768 million in 
2010 (FASEB, 2012). The overall trend is the growth of degree attainment.  
The growth in higher education is in line with educational policies in developed countries. 
Governments have increasingly encouraged the pursuit of education to spur economic growth, 
raise productivity, and increase innovation and the general wellbeing of society (Te Riele & 
Crump, 2003). However, these policies include several inherent assumptions about the demand 
for more educated workers and the education industry. In fact, there is evidence for the opposite: 
inefficiency in labor markets and education systems. 
4 
 
Take the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) workforce as an example. 
On the one hand, there have been arguments claiming a shortage of STEM workers in the United 
States; evidence of this shortage includes the higher salaries and benefits for STEM 
professionals. The arguments have prompted various government initiatives to incentivize 
foreign workforce immigration (U.S. House of Representatives, 2012). On the other hand, many 
STEM graduates have difficulty finding jobs that match their training, and there is an abundant 
supply of STEM PhD graduates who cannot land academic positions (Larson et al., 2013).  
Educational attainment and general job market needs do not appear to be closely matched. 
Data show that the average duration of the job candidate interview process roughly doubled 
between 2010 and 2013 at major companies such as General Mills and Southwest Airlines, 
indicating the difficulty of finding a proper match for open positions (Rampell 2013a). 
Furthermore, many people are employed for jobs that do not require the level of education they 
attained: college graduates performing jobs that do not require a Bachelor’s degree, or PhD 
graduates taking master’s-level jobs, and postdoctoral work becoming a common practice for 
getting an academic position (Battu and Sloane, 2000). With the U.S. national student debt 
growing to $1.2 trillion and two thirds of U.S. college graduates leaving school with some level 
of debt (an average borrower will graduate with $26,600 in debt), there remains a puzzle 
regarding the incentives and mechanisms behind increasing degree attainment (Chopra, 2013; 
Institute for College Access and Success, 2012). These patterns make us doubt whether the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the education sector are truly increasing, and raise a question: 
What are the drivers of increased degree acquisition? 
This paper offers a coherent dynamic theory of educational attainment and inefficiency in 
education systems. We develop a mathematical model and conduct simulation-based analyses to 
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explain how degree attainment can get triggered endogenously and how the supply of a highly 
degreed workforce may not necessarily follow market demand. The theory has policy 
implications for improving performance of the education industry.  
 
1. BACKGROUND: Complexities and Mismatch in STEM workforce 
Ideally, the trend toward increased educational attainment in the workforce should be linked 
to demand for a more educated workforce due to an increasingly complex technological world. 
Let us take Moore’s law (Moore, 1965) as a description of technological growth: Moore’s Law 
says, roughly, that the power of computers doubles approximately every two years. This law has 
been operating at least since 1958, indicating 28 doublings of computers’ abilities. If there is 
such a rapid growth in technological capabilities, one might conclude that complexities of 
production lines and factories that produce such devices should increase at the same pace and so 
too should the need for a more highly educated workforce. Put simply, new technological 
advancements require a more educated workforce. This argument implies that higher degree 
attainment is a rational response to such a need. We call this theory an exogenous theory of 
degree attainment; it is a theory that links an increase in workforce development to market forces 
outside of the education system.  
An exogenous theory succeeds in following the overall trend of degree growth, and partially 
succeeds in explaining the increasing need for STEM graduates in the United States. However, 
there are various indicators that make us doubt whether the growth in educational attainment is 
really driven by our increasingly complex technology-driven society. For example, the existing 
mismatches in the job market signal an inefficient education and degree attainment system or 
marketplace. In 2010, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that there are 28.6 million 
6 
 
jobs requiring a college degree, but at the same time the number of people with a bachelor’s 
degree and higher in the workforce was around 43.8 million (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013b); 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Figure 1 shows the increasing gap over the past two decades 
between the number of employed people with bachelor’s degree and the number of jobs that 
require such degrees. Were the rise in degree attainment a response to the need in labor force and 
growth in technological capability, one would expect more educational training to lead to a better 
match between supply and demand of degrees.  
 
Figure 1. Increasing gap in the employment levels of bachelor’s degree holders or higher in the 
civilian labor force compared with the employment opportunities requiring bachelor’s degree or 
higher between 1994 and 2010 (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
 
There is evidence that workers are hired into jobs that do not require their current 
educational credentials. For example, the college degree is becoming the new high school 
diploma and a new minimum requirement for even the lowest-level jobs (Rampell 2013a). While 
in 1970, less than 1% of taxi drivers and 2% of firefighters had college degrees, now more than 
15% have college credentials in both jobs (Veddar et al., 2013). The mismatch between 
education and a job’s “actual” requirement is not limited to college degree holders. At the PhD 
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level, spending time as a postdoc now greatly improves one’s chances when applying for a 
tenure-track position in academia, a practice not as common even a decade ago. Looking at our 
home university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the number of tenured faculty has 
stayed relatively constant at 1,000 for the past three-plus decades. However, the number of 
postdocs employed has more than tripled over the same time period, and currently there are 
about 1.3 postdocs per faculty member (National Science Foundation, 2011). 
Veddar et al. (2013) estimate that about half of employed college graduates are in jobs that 
require less than a four-year college education; of these, about 5 million are in jobs that do not 
require even a high school education. They report that more than 14 percent of waiters, 
bartenders, and counter and sales clerks hold college degrees. The exogenous theory does not 
explain these patterns (Will, 2014). 
In this paper, however, we provide a different theory, an endogenous theory (Richardson, 
2011) which characterizes the situation. We theorize that higher education is a self-driving 
growth engine. We introduce two different endogenous mechanisms that act on the education 
enterprise, where the number of degree holders can increase dramatically with small changes in 
the job market.  
 
2. THE ENDOGENOUS THEORY 
In the following section, we discuss briefly the theory of endogenous growth in degree 
attainment, and describe two major mechanisms that are rooted in the education system and lead 
to the growth in degree attainment. We provide more in-depth arguments in the subsequent 
sections by developing a dynamic model and analyzing simulation results.  
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Mechanism 1: Pipeline Cascading Effect  
It is no surprise that many popular charts and analyses show that obtaining a university 
degree boosts the chances of getting a job. In the United States, there is significant evidence that 
unemployment is more prevalent for those with lower skills, education, and experience. For 
example, the unemployment rate in 2012 was 12.4% for those who did not complete high school, 
compared to 8.3% for those who completed high school and 4.5% for those with a bachelor’s 
degree (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013a). 
The push to remain competitive in the job market increases demand for educational 
attainment. Looking at data from the recent 2008 recession, college graduates are the only 
employment group that has more people employed in April 2013 than before the recession began 
(Rampell 2013b). However, over the same time period, the majority of the jobs created are low-
skilled and low-wage jobs in food and retail services (Rampell 2013b). This suggests that 
bachelor’s degree holders have a competitive edge over their less-educated peers and that 
employers are hiring college graduates for jobs that do not require college-level skills. Another 
study of U.S. employers in 2009 showed that they tended to place a greater emphasis on hiring 
those with additional qualifications, such as a bachelor’s degree from a four-year college, and 
less emphasis on hiring those with a high school education, compared to before the economic 
downturn (Hart Research Associates 2010).  
Suppose there are two subsets of a population, people who do not have any college level 
degree (group 1), and people with a college degree (group 2). When the number of job 
candidates in group 2 is more than the number of available jobs that require such a degree, some 
of them move down to lower-paid positions that do not require the degree. As college degree 
holders take jobs that do not require a college degree, fewer jobs are available for the other 
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subpopulation, group 1, thus increasing unemployment in this subpopulation. This implies that 
group 1 needs additional educational certification to remain competitive but does not necessarily 
need to acquire any additional training and skills for the sought-after job.  
Now, let us take a holistic approach: If we have n steps of educational attainment, we can 
divide the workforce population to n subpopulations based on their latest degree attainment. 
Suppose each of the n layers has X=10% more qualified people than available jobs, and for 
simplicity suppose that the same number of jobs are available at each level. Then, at top level n, 
all jobs are filled by the top qualified, and the remaining top qualified people take 10% of the 
jobs at level  n–1. That leaves only 90% of n–1 level jobs for the people qualified directly for 
these jobs. So, all of these 90% are taken by level n–1 people, who also take 20% of the n–2 
level jobs. The level n–2 people take all 80% of their available jobs but an additional 30% take 
level n–3 jobs, and so on and so on. The entire mechanism results in a snowballing, reinforcing 
cascade, pushing otherwise qualified individuals into lower and lower job categories, as 
evidenced by Battu and Sloane (2000). In response, we obtain a feedback loop with considerable 
incentive to move up the education ladder and attain higher degrees. The entire push-down and 
then feedback-up processes, which we label as “the cascading effect,” may result from 
certification and not from job qualifications per se.  
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Mechanism 2: Pipeline Reinforcing Effect 
Education costs have been continually growing and academic institutions have tried various 
strategies to protect their institutions financially. Greater revenues can be achieved by increasing 
tuition and admitting more students. Between 1967 and 2010, the total undergraduate enrollment 
in degree-granting institutions tripled from 6 million to 18 million (Snyder and Dillow, 2012). 
More students require a larger teaching workforce, and the abundant supply of PhD students and 
graduates give universities the opportunity to hire them into temporary teaching positions at 
lower costs. Thus, while the full-time-equivalent (FTE) student-to-faculty ratio hovered around 
16:1 between 1976 and 2009 (Snyder and Dillow, 2012) the share of part-time faculty (adjuncts) 
increased from around 24% to 42% over approximately the same period (Curtis and Thornton, 
2013). Meanwhile, tenured and tenure-track faculty dropped from around 45% of instructional 
staff to less than one-fourth. This points to an increasing trend of hiring PhDs into non-tenure 
track academic positions to maintain the FTE student-to-faculty ratio (Curtis 2013). 
An American Association of University Professors’ survey found that the median pay rate 
per course is $2700 for a part-time faculty member (Curtis and Thornton, 2013). Even for a full-
load of 8 courses, the salary for part-time faculty would range from $18,000 at associate’s degree 
colleges to around $30,000 at private doctoral universities, which is less than one-third of the 
salary for a full-time tenured or tenure-track faculty member at the same institutions (Curtis and 
Thornton, 2013).  
In many organized labor forces, this labor-cheapening strategy would have been forbidden 
as an unfair labor practice. With an increase in the number of doctorates, many of those desiring 
tenure-track academic positions end up being employed instead in lower paying, non-tenure 
track positions. For example, the number of engineering PhDs in non-tenure positions in 
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academia has increased by about 60% in the past 10 years (National Science Foundation, 2011). 
With this additional workforce, education enterprises have been able to expand their capacity and 
admit more students, reinforcing the sheer number of educated people. With the increase in low-
paid positions displacing work traditionally occupied by tenure-track professors, the university’s 
production capacity for all degree levels also increases.  
Furthermore, professors who would like to focus more on research activities can buy out 
their teaching load, and universities can then hire lower-waged lecturers and postdocs to teach a 
of variety courses, especially undergraduate courses. This displaces the time professors had to 
spend on lecturing, and allows them to focus instead on research. A byproduct of research 
activities is the training and production of PhD students, leading both to more PhD admissions 
and PhD graduates. Again, we see here a positive feedback loop. 
We argue that the described mechanisms can magnify small exogenous shocks in the job 
market and result in long-term lasting waves of an abundant educated workforce, demand for 
higher education, and mismatch between job market requirements and workforce degree 
attainment.  
In the following sections, we implement the model using a dynamic framework and further 
develop the theory to capture effects of small shocks to the system, representing short-term 
economic downturns, and changes in distribution of jobs, representing technological shifts in 
workplaces. The model demonstrates how short-term economic downturns affect not only the 
current time period, but also have repercussions on the composition of the labor workforce. It 
also shows how a technological shift in the market can over-incentivize the workforce to acquire 
more training. 
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3. MODELING 
Building on other dynamic models of higher education (e.g., Kennedy, 2011; Larson and 
Gomez, 2012; Ghaffarzadegan et al., 2013) we develop a system dynamics model of the 
workforce and credential-based job market. We explore the effects of the described mechanisms 
under two simulation scenarios: 1) a short-term economic downturn, and 2) a technological shift 
that permanently changes the distribution of education requirements. 
We represent the workforce population in an aggregated pipeline where people move 
within the pipeline as they receive more education. Each step in this pipeline will represent a 
subpopulation of the workforce. The population of the pipeline increases as new people enter the 
pipeline and decreases as people leave the pipeline due to retirement or for other personal 
reasons. The model is based mainly on three major rules: 
 Matching: In each time period, the active workforce population is matched to the 
available jobs. The workforce population is evaluated based on their highest level of 
education. If the number of jobs is less than the number in the workforce, some people 
will not find jobs and some will take jobs for which they are overqualified. In this 
model, we assume that people in the workforce prefer to take jobs that match their 
credentials (i.e., their education degree), the ones with higher degrees have competitive 
advantage over the ones with lower degrees, and people cannot take jobs that require 
higher degrees than what they have attained.  
 Education for current workforce: In each time period, there is a normal ratio of people 
who join an education program to receive more education. In addition, we include a 
decision making rule to represent job market-related incentives for education: when one 
does not find a job, he/she has more incentive to obtain education to improve his/her 
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competitiveness in the job market. We see this trend most prominently during economic 
recessions. For example, data from the Graduate Management Admission Council 
(GMAC, 2011) have shown that the MBA application volume follows the inverse of 
the business cycle.1  
 University expansion: We assume a portion of people at the end of the pipeline who do 
not find a fitting job take temporary academic positions such as teaching positions. 
This, in the real world, is analogous to PhD graduates taking temporary lecturer 
positions. These positions are economical for universities. In the past 35 years, due to 
hiring PhD graduates for part-time faculty positions, the ratio of adjunct faculty 
members to total faculty has increased from around 24% to 42% (Curtis and 
Thornton, 2013).  
In the following section, we discuss these rules and represent them within the model 
structure. All formulation details and parameter values are presented in the Appendix. The goal 
of our simulation experiments is to offer a coherent and empirically testable theory regarding the 
dynamics of unemployment and underemployment as affected by education. The model 
represents a hypothetical context; we make no claim that it depicts detailed U.S. or other labor 
markets precisely. Rather, we seek to understand first-order dynamics, given our postulated 
assumptions. 
3.1. Workforce pipeline 
                                                 
1 Application volumes to full-time MBA programs in 2001-2002 increased, when the economy slowed, and dropped 
off during the recovery in 2004-2005. Similarly, when the global recession began in 2007, full-time MBA 
applications increased in 2008 and peaked in 2009, and have since decreased during the recovery. This trend is 
reflected in enrollment trends as well: in 2010, there were over 8 million students over the age of 25 enrolled in 
higher education institutions, 1.2 million more than in 2007 (Cowan and Kessler, 2013). 
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For n steps of degree attainment, the workforce population can be divided into n 
subpopulations based on each individual’s highest attained degree. Subpopulation i will represent 
people whose highest degree is the degree level i. Let Wi represent the active workforce in the ith 
subpopulation. The pipeline also includes people who are in schools receiving more education, 
and therefore are not active in the market. We represent number of students who are attaining the 
ith level degree as Si. Similarly, let Ji represent number of jobs that require at least degree i of 
education. 
We can write:  
Total “active” workforce = W1 + W2 +… + Wi +… + Wn 
Total students = S2 + S3 +… + Si +… + Sn 
Total jobs = J1 + J2 +… + Ji +… + Jn                            
In the interest of parsimony, let us analyze the system for n=3, as Figure 2 depicts. In this 
model, we have three different subpopulations of active workforce (boxes in grey: W1, W2, and 
W3), and two stages of education (boxes in white: S2, and S3) working as transition stages 
between W1 to W2, and W2 to W3, respectively. To offer a concrete example for this 
categorization, W1 can represent people with a high school degree, and W2 and W3 can represent 
two stages of education such as undergraduate and graduate degrees. In this example, S2 will be 
undergraduate students and S3 will be graduate students.  
 
Figure 2. Stock-Flow representation of workforce group i 
Workforce 1
(W1)
Workforce 2
(W2)
Workforce 3
(W3)
New W1 rate S2 admission S3 admission
W1 attrition
rate
W2 attrition
rate
W3 attrition
rate
Students 2
(S2)
New W2 rate
Students 3
(S3)
New W3 rate
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We assume, in each time period, a constant flow of people enter W1. In each period, some 
members of the W1 workforce exit the pipeline due to retirement or other personal reasons (W1 
attrition rate), some stay in the active workforce population, and some decide to obtain more 
education (S2 admission). People in the S2 stage receive more education and enter the W2 
subpopulation with a delay representing the time it takes to earn the degree. People who newly 
join W2 may move to S3 (immediately or with a delay) to obtain more education, or may stay in 
W2 until retirement. In this simple model, W3 is the end point, while in reality the pipeline may 
have additional stages (such as postdoctoral trainings). 
3.2. Matching mechanism 
We intuitively expect that the distribution of workforce and jobs do not necessarily 
match. Consequently, in each subpopulation, we may have unemployed (people who do not find 
a job) and underemployed people (people who take jobs for which they are overqualified). 
Figure 3 depicts how jobs are taken by different subpopulations in our model. In the figure, while 
the workforce moves from left to right (from W1 to W3), jobs are distributed from right to left 
(from J3 to J1). 
In this model, we first estimate the shortage in the number of jobs for the most-educated 
workforce (W3). The shortage is represented by the variable Job discrepancy 3. It is basically the 
difference between the number of people in the subpopulation and the number of jobs. For 
positive values, this variable indicates that there are people in the subpopulation W3 who do not 
find a job fitting their level of educational attainment.  
A portion of the people who do not find a fitting job remain unemployed (in the figure: 
U3) and a portion become underemployed taking J2 level jobs (in the figure: UD3). The 
16 
 
remaining J2 level jobs (in the figure, J’2) will be taken by W2. Similarly, unemployment and 
underemployment are calculated for the rest of the pipeline.  
3.3. Education for current workforce 
In each time period, a portion of the population decides to pursue higher education and 
move up the pipeline. In addition to societal and personal reasons that incentivize higher 
education, one reason for receiving more education is to get a better job. The latter motivation 
makes more sense in particular when one’s chance of employment significantly increases by 
obtaining more education. Figure 3 includes job market incentives to pursue education. 
We formulate the tendency to seek an education level (represented by S2 application rate 
and S3 application rate in Figure 3), as a function of normal rate of education and job 
discrepancy, the latter representing job market incentives to study more. The normal rate 
represents all other personal and social incentives and is set to create a net-flow of people who 
replace the ones permanently exiting the workforce. In our model, university admissions (S2 
admission and S3 admission) are constrained by university capacities (C2 and C3).  
  
Figure 3. Flows and distribution of workforce and jobs 
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The links from job discrepancies (Job discrepancy 1 and Job discrepancy 2) to university 
admissions (S2 and S3) close several feedback loops as presented in Figure 3. For example, as we 
face more job shortages for group 1, Job discrepancy 1 increases, and there is more incentive to 
pursue education among W1. Therefore, S2 admission rises. As more W1 leaves to attain S2 
education, W1 declines, in turn compensating for job shortages (a short-term balancing loop). 
However, in a longer time period, as the number of people in W2 increases, more of them take J1 
jobs, fewer jobs become available for W1, and more individuals of W1 obtain education, adding to 
the W2 subpopulation (a reinforcing loop). A simulation analysis of the interactions between 
these reinforcing and balancing loops can reveal which ones are dominant.  
3.4. University Capacity Dynamics  
Universities tend to expand their capacities by hiring the most-educated subpopulation 
for temporary teaching positions. We formulate University Capacity as a function of permanent 
positions and temporary positions. We assume a constant value for permanent positions, and 
formulate temporary positions as a function of job discrepancy in the most-educated 
subpopulation. In our model, temporary positions are taken by people in the workforce group W3 
who do not find a fitting job. Figure 4 shows the resulting feedback structures.  
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Figure 4. Temporary positions in universities and resulting feedback loops 
In this figure, as more people obtain the highest degree, some are offered temporary 
positions in academia contributing to training more S2 and S3 students (reinforcing loops). 
However, these positions decrease the number of people in W3 who need to take J2 level jobs, 
which in turn raises jobs that are available for W2 people (a balancing loop). The ratio of people 
who take temporary positions is also a parameter in our sensitivity analysis below.  
The described model can be simulated after parameterization. Consistent with the goal of 
our simulation, which is to offer a coherent theory to understand first-order dynamics (rather 
than an empirical replication of a specific market), we set the model parameters. Details of the 
formulations and parameter values are documented in the Appendix.  
 
4. SIMULATION 
As stated, we conduct two experiments with the model, each representing one of the 
scenarios. In each experiment, an exogenous shock is introduced to the system and we then 
examine how the system reacts to those shocks. The exogenous shock for the first experiment is 
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a short-term decline (negative pulse) in the number of jobs, and in the second experiment it is a 
shift in the distribution of jobs while keeping the total number of jobs constant.  
 We assume that in the steady state in each of the three subpopulations there is an active 
workforce of 1,000 people. We also assume that for each subpopulation there are 1,000 jobs (an 
active workforce totaling 3,000 people, and 3,000 jobs). Thus, initially, no unemployment or 
underemployment exist. We first conduct the experiments with the model for a specific set of 
parameters and then conduct a broader sensitivity analysis with changes to the major parameters.  
4.1. Experiment 1: a short-term economic downturn and loss in number of jobs. 
Let us assume at t=5 that there is a 20% shortage in the number of jobs at all levels due to 
a short-term economic recession for 5 years, and then at t=10 we go back to the initial number of 
3,000 jobs and remain there. We expect the workforce to react to the shock, and in the recession 
period some people lose jobs, some take jobs for which they are overqualified to avoid 
unemployment, some remain unemployed, and some pursue more education to improve their 
chances of getting a job. One might think that after job market recovery at t=10, the system 
should return very quickly to its stage prior to the recession, with everyone having an appropriate 
job. Our simulation result does not support this intuition. Figure 5a shows how the shock is 
entered to the model as input; Figure 5b shows simulation outputs. 
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(a) Experiment 1 Input 
Distribution of Jobs in Different Time Periods 
(b) Experiment 1 Output 
Distribution of the Workforce in Different Time Periods 
  
  
 
Figure 5 – Effects of a pulse decline in number of jobs available at 5 ≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 10 (a) on the 
distribution of workforce overtime (b) 
As the figure shows, the 20% shock during 5 ≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 10 creates overshoot and 
undershoot in the workforce numbers in different groups. The number of the most-educated 
population increases beyond the equilibrium value and shows an overshoot pattern. The 
distribution of the workforce also changes, and for a long time we see a non-uniform distribution 
with a shortage of people in the middle-skilled workforce. As the figure shows, changes in the 
distributions of the workforce last for a long time before the distributions eventually return to the 
steady state. 
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As a measure of efficiency, we are interested in measuring the mismatch between 
education and job types in each group and capturing the ratio of people who take jobs for which 
they are overqualified. The measure of mismatch, Mi, is defined as the ratio of people in group 
Wi who do not find a Ji type of work:  
𝑀𝑖 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖, 0)
𝑊𝑖
 
Figure 6 shows the trend of the mismatch for each workforce group during the recession 
and for a long time after.  
 
Figure 6: Mismatch index in each workforce subgroup as results of a short-term 
recession between t=5 and t=10. 
 
As the figure shows, there are two different trends of mismatch: one short term as a quick 
response to the recession, and one long term. In the short run, the lower-skilled workforce 
experiences most of the economic recession burden and people with higher skills take their jobs 
(see M1). In the long run, however, as people respond to the recession and try to move up the 
workforce pipeline, the ones with higher education experience more mismatch and 
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underemployment (see M3). Due to the flow of the workforce to attain more education, the 
mismatch remains in the system long after the recession, until the overeducated workforce retires 
from the pipeline.  
Let us recall that the entire recession is operationalized as a short-term pulse function and 
that the number of jobs returns to its previous stage at t=10, so the second wave of pressure on 
the workforce comes as an endogenous response to the flow of the workforce. In other words, 
around t=10 and t=30, the job market for the highly educated population has become tight due to 
internal feedbacks within the workforce and education system.  
Overall, the change in the distribution of the workforce causes many people to take jobs 
for which they are overqualified, an indicator for lack of efficiency in the system. One can 
imagine how the most-educated population will feel around time=20: “The economic recession 
finished 10 years ago, jobs are back, but somehow we still feel recessionary pressures!” Seeing 
a small picture of the entire system, the most-educated group may not even agree that the 
economic recession is gone and their past response to acquire education is the source of the new 
job market pressures.  
 
4.2. Experiment 2: an upward shift in the distribution of jobs. 
Let us represent technological shifts in the society by changing the distribution of the jobs 
at t=5 to create greater demand for higher levels of education. In this simulation experiment, the 
numbers of jobs in each category changes from J1=J2=J3=1,000 jobs to J1= 750, J2=1000, and 
J3=1250 at t=5 and stays the same thereafter. The total number of jobs before and after the 
exogenous shock is the same (total of 3,000 jobs), and the only change is the distribution in favor 
of the most-educated group of the population. We expect the shock to provide more incentives 
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for the workforce to attain higher degrees, and would like to examine the transition to the new 
steady-state condition. Figure 7a shows how input to our model is formulated, and Figure 7b 
shows the effects on the workforce population.  
As the figure indicates, the workforce overreacts for a long time, and each group 
experiences overshoot or undershoot in different time periods until, after a long delay, it reaches 
equilibrium.  
 
(a) Experiment 2 Input 
Distribution of Jobs in Different Time Periods 
(b) Experiment 2 Output 
Distribution of the Workforce in Different Time Periods 
  
  
Figure 7: Magnified effects of a change in the distribution of jobs available from time = 5 
representing a technological change (a) on the distribution of workforce overtime (b) 
 
Figure 8 shows the trend of mismatch in different workforce subpopulations. The shift in 
technology first affects the lower-skilled workers (see M1), but with delays two separate waves 
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emerge affecting other subpopulations (M2 and M3). It is interesting to note that the wave reaches 
the most-educated population (see M3) when we do not see any mismatch among the least-
educated population. We can imagine how the most-educated population will feel: Technology 
has changed in favor of us, we responded intelligently and studied more, there are more jobs for 
us, but somehow it seems we have wasted our time and are taking jobs that do not require our 
education! Seeing a small picture of the whole system, the most-educated group may not even 
agree that the number of jobs for the most-educated workforce has increased, and the mismatch 
comes as result of their “intelligent” reactions. 
 
Figure 8: Mismatch index in each workforce subgroup as results of a shift in the 
distribution of jobs at t=5. 
These two experiments simply represent a short-term decline in the number of jobs and a 
change in the distribution of jobs. In the real world, these changes can happen as results of short-
term economic declines, technological shifts, or both. Our theory predicts long-term lasting 
effects that cascade to the most-educated population. The magnified effects go beyond short-
term pressures and can create long-term waves in the job market that are reinforced 
25 
 
endogenously by delays and feedback loops. They eventually affect the most-educated 
population by causing them to take jobs for which they are overqualified.  
The model is simple and is run with hypothetical parameter values to develop a coherent 
theory. However, sensitivity analysis on major parameters helps us generalize the arguments and 
find the conditions under which we might observe more endogenously generated mismatch.  
4.3. Simulation for a larger range of parameters 
We extend our analysis to a larger parameter space: experiment 1 with different sizes of 
economic shocks, and experiment 2 with different magnitudes of technological shifts, both in 
interaction with different values for temporary positions in academia.  
First, we simulate the model for different values of short-term economic shocks ranging 
from 0% to 30% decline in the number of jobs for 5 years times different values of r. Figure 9 
depicts a few selected simulation runs over time for 4 sizes of economic shocks (-5%, -10%, -
20%, and -50% shocks in figures 9a, 9b, 9c, and 9d, respectively). Each graph shows the result 
of a different value for the ratio that take temporary positions (r = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05 and 0.2). 
The r = 0 conditions represent the dynamics of economic shock in the absence of any temporary 
positions in academia. Higher values of r demonstrate the effects of adding these temporary 
positions.  
In all simulation runs, we see the overshoot pattern in which the magnitude of the 
overshoot is higher for stronger economic shocks. However, r has an interactive effect: for 
smaller economic shocks (see Fig. 9a), we see that the magnitude of overshoot declines for 
higher values of r, implying that more temporary positions decrease the overshoot; for larger 
values of economic shocks (see Fig. 9d), the magnitude of overshoot increases with larger values 
of r. In addition, very large values of r help dampen the overshoot more quickly.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c)  
 
(d) 
 
Figure 9: Number of the most-educated group (W3) in different scenarios. Note: r represents the 
ratio of highly educated people who do not find fitting jobs and take temporary positions in 
academia.  
For a systematic examination of the magnitude of overshoot in W3 (the most-educated 
workforce) in different conditions, we can examine the ratio of the maximum magnitude of the 
long-term wave in W3 to the same variable in the corresponding r = 0 condition. We name this 
variable Normalized W3 overshoot size. Put simply, the Normalized W3 overshoot size for shock 
size = -20% and r = 0.05 will show the ratio of the overshoot size in this condition to the 
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condition with shock size = -20% and r = 0. Higher values of the Normalized W3 overshoot size 
would mean we have had larger amplitudes in long-term waves. Figure 10 shows the results. 
 
 
Figure 10: The size of overshoot in the number of the most-educated group (W3) for different 
values of short-term economic shock size vs. r (percentage of people taking temporary positions) 
The results imply two major points. First, as we expect, larger short-term economic 
shocks result in larger mismatches in the highest-educated group. In the figure, as shock size 
increases we see a larger value for W3 overshoot size. Second, temporary positions in academia 
have interactive effects with the magnitude of long-term shocks, with a tipping point (Repenning 
et al., 2001; Rudolph and Repenning, 2002; Morrison 2012) after which the direction of effect of 
temporary positions on overshoot changes. In major recessions, as more people are hired into 
temporary academic positions (e.g., in the figure, see Shock Size = –30% and r between 0 and 
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
0.015
0.03
0.045
0.06
0.075
W
3
 o
ve
rs
h
o
o
t 
si
ze
 
(n
o
rm
al
iz
ed
)
28 
 
0.03) we see that the long-term mismatch sharply increases. This is due to the dominance of the 
pipeline reinforcing effect that results in training more and more people in academia, with 
society ending up with an abundant number of highly educated people, more than what the job 
market desires. Notably, there is a tipping point after which the effect of r reverses. This is more 
apparent for smaller shocks: temporary positions help dampen economic shocks (e.g., in Fig. 10, 
see Economic Shock Size = –10% and r between 0 and 0.075). The reason is that these positions 
absorb people who do not find permanent jobs during short-term recessions, dampening the 
cascading effect and therefore mitigating what could have been extra pressure on the lower-
educated population.  
The bottom line is that for the range of parameters we tested, the endogenous growth in 
mismatch showed up, but the effect is worse for major recessions and during these the effects are 
likely to be magnified with temporary positions in academia. In smaller economic shocks, 
however, temporary positions can dampen the shocks, working as a buffer and absorbing highly 
educated people who otherwise would have taken the jobs of relatively lower-educated groups.  
Next, we simulate the model for different values of the technological shift (the number of 
jobs taken from J1 and added to J3) times different values of r. Figure 11 depicts a few selected 
simulation runs over time for 4 sizes of technological shifts (25%, 30%, 32%, and 34% shocks in 
figures 11a, 11b, 11c, and 11d, respectively). Each graph shows the result of a different value for 
the ratio of people who take temporary positions (r = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, and 0.2).  
In simulation runs for r = 0, we see a goal-seeking pattern. As the value of r increases in 
Figs. 10a, b, and c, an overshooting pattern emerges in which the magnitude of the overshoot is 
higher for stronger economic shocks for two middle parameter values (30% and 32%, Fig 10b 
and 10c, respectively). This shows there is a window of parameters for technological shift within 
29 
 
which we see a large overshoot. In Figures 10a, b, and c, we can see the magnifying effect on 
overshoot of r. Higher values of r lead to a faster appearance of overshoot, and faster dampening.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c)  
 
(d) 
Figure 11: Number of the most-educated group (W3) in different scenarios. Note: r represents 
the ratio of highly educated people who do not find a fitting a job and take temporary positions in 
academia.  
Figure 12 shows a more systematic comparison of the magnitude of overshoot in the 
number of the most-educated workforce. The figure shows that there is a window of parameter 
values for a technological shift to result in long-term waves of underemployment. Smaller 
technological changes will not result in overshoot in the system, and the workforce will slowly 
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adapt itself to the new equilibrium. However, as the shift passes a tipping point (in our model, 
25%) and creates enough incentive to attain more education, more people go to schools and once 
the new wave of the students graduate, the job market ends up with an abundance of highly 
educated individuals. Notably, very large technological changes also will not result in 
mismatches for the highest-educated workforce. This is mainly due to absorbing all people who 
obtain education into new high-tech positions without allowing activation of the cascading 
effect.  
 
Figure 12: The size of overshoot in number of the most-educated group (W3) for different values 
of technological shift vs. r (percentage of people taking temporary positions) 
 
The U-shaped effect of r is also worth mentioning. As people are hired into temporary 
positions (r > 0), the magnitude of overshoot increases until a tipping point, after which it 
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declines. This is related to the range of parameters in which the pipeline reinforcing effect 
becomes dominant over the buffering effect of temporary positions. While the actual values of 
this parameter are empirical questions, our model predicts that overshoot emerges in a specific 
range of technological shifts in the market.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We presented a simple model to capture how feedback structures within labor and education 
sectors can lead to excess degree accumulation, magnified pressures on those with lower 
degrees, underemployment, and long-term pressures on people with higher degrees. We 
introduced two major feedback mechanisms that act on the education enterprise and cause the 
number of educated people to increase dramatically, with relatively short-term changes in the job 
market. First, we introduced a cascading effect that represents how job shortages throughout the 
pipeline cascade toward lower-skilled individuals as people with more education take jobs for 
which they are overqualified. The mechanism also creates incentives to move up the workforce 
pipeline. Second, we introduced a capacity reinforcing mechanism that results in increasing the 
population of PhDs by employing a portion of them in temporary academic positions. These two 
mechanisms create self-driving growth engines that are adequate to over-incentivize degree 
attainment, and can affect the long-term match between supply and demand for college-educated 
labor.  
These mechanisms make the system vulnerable to small and short-term external shocks. As 
a result, we end up with individuals who attain higher degrees of education to take jobs that do 
not require these degrees, but give them a competitive advantage over people without those 
degrees. The implication is education system inefficiency; some waste their time in the education 
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system simply to obtain a degree they need to compete in the marketplace. In the real world, this 
means investing some of the most productive years of one’s career during one’s late 20s and 
early 30s in getting a degree to use for job hunting, with no use for the degree after taking the job 
other than ensuring a higher salary. At a societal level, the return on such an investment is 
questionable.   
The feedback mechanisms described in this paper are not the only ones that exist and can 
intensify underemployment and mismatch in labor force. For example, there are dynamics on the 
labor force demand side that are triggered by employers. Job requirements can change based on 
social consensus about what type of people should perform which jobs. If a job is traditionally 
done by a worker with a master’s degree, people can perceive the job as one that requires a 
master’s degree. However, our perceptions about requirements are not fixed. Once the job is 
taken by higher degree holders, social mores can evolve towards the job requiring a higher 
degree. Employers can shift the requirements and begin to expect workers to have that higher 
degree. Looking back in the history of higher education in engineering schools, we see many 
faculty positions that were taken by experienced engineers with a bachelor or a master’s degree, 
a practice that may seem strange in the 21st century.  
The story does not end here. With an abundant number of job applicants, educational 
degrees now also act as a proxy for gauging dedication and overall capabilities. There is a high 
degree of uncertainty surrounding job candidates that is rarely revealed until they are hired. In 
such uncertain, subjective, and noisy environments, degrees can be seen as objective signals of 
capabilities. As a result, employers whose jobs typically have not required a degree are using 
degrees as a signaling mechanism to differentiate among applicants vying for the same position 
(Tyler et al. 2000). This effect should work stronger as other information cues become more 
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uncertain and as the number of applicants increases. The result is that the lengthy time spent on 
education gives a signal that could have been otherwise observed by patient employers in a few 
months after hiring a new employee.   
We provide simulation-based evidence that for a wide range of parameter values the 
education system can create magnified pressures endogenously on those with lower degrees, and 
long-term waves of pressures on those with higher degrees. The main driver of these dynamic 
patterns is the structure of the system: the reinforcing loops to push down short-term job 
shortages to the lower-educated population and incentivize more education, and to take 
temporary positions in academia, adding to the capacity of universities and future outputs. 
Delays in attaining a degree also contribute to overshoot in workforce numbers for a limited 
number of jobs.  
The behavior is similar to the bullwhip effect in supply chains and demand amplifications 
throughout supply chains (Lee et al., 1997; Sterman, 1989 and 2000; Andersen et al., 2000; 
Akkermans & Vos, 2003). It is shown that a small external shock (or just expecting a shock 
(Croson et al., 2014)) creates long-term waves of backlog and inventory, and overall inefficiency 
throughout the chain. In supply chains, however, providing clear information may help correct 
the bullwhip effect. Here, we cannot easily argue that the problem of self-driving growth engines 
in education stems solely from a lack of information. Individuals seeking fitting jobs face 
competitors with higher degrees, as if the rules of the game are changed. For example, it is 
getting much more difficult to argue that postdoctoral training is not necessarily required for an 
academic position, while a few decades ago such training were not at all common, and many 
newly minted PhDs would land tenure-track jobs immediately after graduation; today, 
universities take for granted that new hires should have years of postdoctoral training. 
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Furthermore, the abundance of PhDs (Larson et al., 2013) who decide to look for non-academic 
positions end up applying for different positions in research centers, many of which do not need 
their specific and narrow PhD training. However, these PhDs are likely to win the competition 
over applicants with master’s degrees, persuading the latter that one needs a PhD to get any 
research position. And the story continues making a college degree a must for jobs that do not 
necessarily benefit from the type of training offered in colleges.  
We tried to simplify the analysis by designing two clear experiments with the model. We 
investigated the effects of a pulse shock and a change in the distribution of jobs separately to 
capture effects of change in the average number of jobs and change in the distribution of jobs 
one at a time, while controlling for the other. In the real world, they are likely to happen 
concurrently. For example, there is no guarantee that for each W1 job that disappears exactly one 
W3 job emerges; in fact, one might expect that the number of high-tech jobs that are replacing 
former low-tech jobs is smaller. This adds to the magnitude of long-term waves throughout the 
education pipeline and makes the system more vulnerable. Overall, the education system seems 
to be in structural disequilibria (Teitelbaum, 2008).  
The theory has several policy implications. First, while federal funding for short-term 
academic positions such as postdocs and temporary teaching positions might be helpful for 
current PhDs, it is not a proper policy from a big-picture perspective. These positions help PhD 
graduates have temporary jobs, but also free professors’ teaching time, with the side effect of 
graduating more PhD students! Universities that offer course-release policies so faculty members 
can allocate a relatively small portion of their funding in exchange for not teaching also 
contribute to exacerbating this situation. More funding comes to the university, more PhD 
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scholarships are provided, and more PhDs will compete for a fixed number of academic 
positions.  
Our study has several limitations. The model was offered to develop a theory, and as 
stated we made no claim that our simulation model precisely depicts detailed labor markets in 
the United States or elsewhere. Rather, we tried to understand first-order dynamics, given our 
postulated assumptions. Future models can address more layers of complexities and include 
more details. They can also be calibrated to reproduce real-world patterns and be validated 
against different cases (Groesser and Schwaninger, 2012).  
Furthermore, our study focused on a specific type of mismatch. However, the problem of 
mismatch between education and job market goes much beyond the analysis in this study. Our 
model depicts a simple one-dimensional mismatch between the level of degree and job 
requirement; in the real world, there are multiple dimensions of mismatch between training and 
job requirements. For example, people may undergo training that lags behind technologies used 
in a given industry. The delay between education colloquia and industry needs may result in 
teaching techniques that are outdated. More elaboration on the dynamics of mismatch between 
education and industry is a future avenue of research.  
In summary, we offered a new explanation for inefficiency in the education sector. We 
hypothesized that small economic changes in the market last for a long period, have magnified 
and immediate effects on the lower-educated workforce, and with a delay affect the most-
educated group due to education escalation and the abundance of an overqualified workforce. In 
this context, people end up obtaining education only to have a competitive advantage during the 
hiring period, without any further use. The overall result is extra spending on education, a 
corresponding loss of working years, and an increase in student debt. Recalling our opening 
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quote from Clive James, investing significant time and money to learn Newton’s force equations 
for rotating and falling circular objects does not seem to be an efficient strategy for better 
hamburger flipping. 
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Online Appendix: Detailed formulations 
Formulations Comment 
1. Workforce 
d/dt(W1)= NW1-SAd2-EW1 
d/dt(W2)= NW2-SAd3-EW2 
d/dt(W3)= NW3-EW3  
Wi: Workforce with degree I;  
Initial values = 1000 
NWi: New Wi Rate 
EWi: Exit Wi rate 
SAdi: Student Admission to pursue degree i 
NW1 =150 
NW2 =DELAY3(SAd2, T2) 
NW3 =DELAY3(SAd3, T3) 
DELAY3: Third Order Delay,  
T2 and T3: Average time to graduate 
EW1 = αW1 
EW2 = αW2 
EW3 = αW3 
α=0.05 
T2=5 
T3=2 
This set represents workforce with 
three stock variables, W1, W2, and W3.   
 
Each stock increases as new people 
join and declines as people exit the 
workforce pipeline or, for W1 and W2, 
decide to pursue education (W3 is 
assumed to be the end of the pipeline). 
2. Jobs 
J1 = 1000  
J2 = 1000  
J3 = 1000 
  Ji: Jobs that require degree i 
 
J'1 = J1 - UD2 
J'2 = J2 – UD3 
J’i: Ji available for Wi,  
UDi: Underemployment; Wi taking Ji-1 jobs 
 
∆1 = W1-J'1  
∆2 = W2-J'2 
∆3 = W3-J3-TPA 
∆i: Job discrepancy i 
 
This set represents jobs and how they 
are distributed.  
 
It also estimates job discrepancies for 
each subpopulation, which represents 
the difference between number of jobs 
for a degree and number of people with 
that degree.  
3. Unemployment and underemployment 
U1= ∆1 
U2= ∆2 - UD2 
U3= ∆3 - UD3 
Ui: Unemployment 
UDi: Underemployment; Wi taking Ji-1 jobs 
UR= 0.9 
UR: Max Under-employment ratio  
UD2= Min(Max(0, UR*∆2),J1) 
UD3= Min(Max(0, UR*∆3)-Hiring TPA,J2)  
Hiring TPA: W3 taking temporary position in 
academia  
 
 This set estimates unemployment and 
underemployment.  
 
Unemployment for W1 is basically job 
shortage. For W2 and W3 it is equal to 
job shortage minus the number of 
people who take lower-level jobs 
(underemployment).  
 
UR represents underemployment ratio; 
the ratio of people that don’t find a 
fitting job (∆i) and willing to take a 
lower level job, if available.  
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4. Temporary Positions (TPA)  
d/dt(TPA)= Hiring TPA-Leaving TPA  
TPA: Temporary Academic Positions 
Initial value = 0 
Hiring TPA =r*max(0, ∆3) 
r=0.05  
Leaving TPA= TPA/Time in TPA 
Time in TPA= 2 
CTPA=TPA*Average Cap Per TPA  
Average Cap Per TPA = 20 
CTPA: Additional capacity due to hiring TPAs 
 
This set represents temporary positions 
in academia, such as postdocs and 
lecturer positions. It is assumed the 
positions are for 2 year. And in the 
base run 5% of people in W3 that don’t 
find a fitting job take temporary 
positions in academia.  
 
The capacity of university is assumed 
on average to increase 20 students per 
person hired in temporary position.   
5. Students  
C= CN + CTPA 
CN=150*1.33 
C2=kC 
C3=(1-k)C  
k=2/3 
C: Total university capacity;  
Ci: Capacity for admitting Si  
 
d/dt(S2)= SAd2-NW2 
d/dt(S3)= SAd3-NW3 
Si: Students getting degree i 
Initial values: S2(t=0)=500, S3(t=0)=100  
 
SAd2= Min(C2,SAp2) 
SAd3= Min(C3,SAp3) 
SApi: Applications for college, degree i 
 
SAp2= SAp2,N + SAp2,extra  
SAp3= SAp3,N + SAp3,extra  
 
SAp2,N =Smooth(-EW1+NW1, T) 
SAp3,N =Smooth(-EW2+NW2, T) 
T=3 
SAp3,extra = β∆2 
SAp2,extra = β∆1 
β = 0.2 
This set represents applicants (SAp), 
admission rate (SAd), number of 
students (S), and graduation rate (NW) 
for two degrees.  
6. General  
TIME STEP = 0.015625 
FINAL TIME = 150  
Operational parameters for simulation. 
 
 
 
